Section 6

HARBOR Signals

What HARBOR's methodology reveals about Connected Logistics's potential: readiness scoring, productization paths, and the framings worth testing internally.

This is unsolicited HARBOR research prepared from public sources for discussion with Chris Choby. It is not a deliverable under any executed engagement, contains analytical estimates, and should not be relied upon for investment, pricing, or business-development decisions. Statements attributed to Connected Logistics are drawn from public materials and have not been independently confirmed by the company.

HARBOR Readiness Score: 64/100

Scored across the HARBOR framework (Product-market fit × 25 + Vehicle Access × 20 + Certification Edge × 20 + Team Capability × 15 + Recurring Revenue × 10 + Brand Clarity × 10).

Dimension	Score	Max	Rationale
Product-Market Fit	17	25	NGT-II is a real product with recurring airtime. RF-ITV is a productized service. But 85%+ of revenue is still custom services. Not yet a SaaS/product company.
Vehicle Access	17	20	10 vehicles + GSA Schedule, all 3 OASIS+ pools. Only gap: SeaPort-NxG (Navy). Otherwise best-in-class for a small business.
Certification Edge	18	20	CMMC L2 (110/110 controls MET per company release) (ahead of mandate). TS FCL, ISO 20000/27001/9001, DCAA. Only missing: CMMC L3 (not required yet) and FedRAMP (cloud).
Team Capability	11	15	Forrest Burke + Kiran Rathod + Eric Strauss is a formidable triad. Chris Choby is new (7 months). Richard Ahn (pricing) is a smart recent add. Risk: founder-centric.
Recurring Revenue	5	10	Only ~15-20% recurring. Services-heavy model. NGT-II airtime is promising but small. GSA Schedule is steady but low-volume.
Brand Clarity	6	10	Website is generic federal IT. Hardware story buried. Army Science Board not mentioned. "Class XI" is clever but opaque to non-logistics buyers.

What 64/100 Means Connected Logistics is above the HARBOR threshold (55) for productization readiness. They're not a startup. They have 19 years of delivery, $288M in federal awards, and real products. The delta between 64 and 85+ is: (1) grow recurring revenue to 40%+ through productized offerings, (2) fix the Navy gap (SeaPort-NxG), (3) clarify the brand, and (4) build a product roadmap beyond transponders.

If we re-weight the rubric toward recurring revenue, the score drops to ~55. The published rubric weights access dimensions (Vehicle + Cert = 40 pts) almost twice as heavily as the product dimensions (Recurring + Brand = 20 pts). A version that doubled Recurring Revenue weight and added a "Founder Risk" dimension (single-CEO dependency) would put Connected Logistics at threshold rather than above it. Worth knowing which rubric you trust before deciding how urgent the productization work is.

3 Productization Candidates (S2P Scored)

Using HARBOR's Suitability-to-Productize (S2P) framework: Repeatability, Scalability, Margin, Buyer Independence, and Delivery Cost.

Candidate A: RF-ITV / NGT-II "In-Transit Visibility as a Service"

S2P Dimension	Score
Repeatability	9/10
Scalability	6/10
Margin	8/10
Buyer Independence	4/10
Delivery Cost	6/10

S2P Score: 66/100

What it is: Package transponder hardware + airtime + 24/7 Service Desk + cloud dashboard as a subscription offering. Currently delivered via ITES-3S task orders and GSA Schedule orders. Repackage as "Connected Visibility Platform". SaaS pricing per asset tracked per month.

The boundary problem: RF-ITV is the Army G-4's program. The data schema and the buyer relationship sit with the Army, not LOGC2. Selling Army a SaaS layer on top of Army's own program requires Army CIO authorization, a multi-year path. The cleaner ITV-as-a-Service market is NATO, state/local emergency management, and commercial logistics, where LOGC2 owns the hardware, airtime, and service desk.

Why the score moved from 74 to 66: Buyer Independence drops from 6 to 4 because Army owns the platform. Scalability drops because FedRAMP-equivalent ATO gates commercial-adjacent expansion. Delivery cost rises with capex on hardware inventory. Still a real product line, but a 24-month strategic play, not a Sprint target.

Long-term move: Put RF-ITV Service Desk on GSA Schedule as a cloud service (SIN 519120). Build a self-service portal targeted at NATO + state/local. Price per transponder/month.

Candidate B: CMMC "Compliance-in-a-Box" for Small Primes

S2P Dimension	Score
Repeatability	8/10
Scalability	9/10
Margin	7/10
Buyer Independence	7/10
Delivery Cost	6/10

S2P Score: 74/100

What it is: Connected Logistics achieved CMMC L2 certification (110/110 per company release). They built NIST 800-171-compliant environments, policies, and training. Package this as a "CMMC Readiness Sprint". A 90-day guided compliance program for other SDVOSBs and SBs who need to meet the mandate but can't afford a C3PAO.

Why it works: CMMC is now mandatory for ALL new DoD contracts handling CUI. Tens of thousands of small primes are scrambling. Connected Logistics has the scars, the templates, and the C3PAO relationship. This is knowledge arbitrage.

Addressable market: 100,000+ defense contractors needing CMMC L2. GSA Schedule (they already have one) or OASIS+ SB pool for delivery. Can sell to primes who need compliant subcontractors.

HARBOR action: Add a SIN for cybersecurity consulting to GSA Schedule. Build a fixed-price "CMMC L2 Ready" package ($25K-$75K depending on complexity). Market to DLA JETS 2.0 and ITES-3S teammates who need CMMC.

Candidate C: DLA JETS "Cyber Hygiene" Managed Service

S2P Dimension	Score
Repeatability	9/10
Scalability	8/10
Margin	7/10
Buyer Independence	5/10
Delivery Cost	6/10

S2P Score: 70/100

What it is: Productize the NETOPS, CERT CSSP, micro-segmentation, and ForeScout work they already deliver to DLA into a "DLA Cyber Hygiene" retainer. Continuous monitoring, patch management, zero-trust micro-segmentation, and 24/7 SOC-as-a-service.

Why it works: 7 of their active task orders are cybersecurity. DLA is their dominant customer. Instead of bidding each task order separately, propose a recurring managed service across multiple DLA sites. FFP per site/month. Reduces DLA procurement burden (one vehicle, one task order, predictable spend).

Addressable market: DLA alone has 20+ major sites. Expand to Army PAE AS&A (which includes ammunition depots and logistics centers). The fixed-price EO actually helps here. DLA wants predictable cyber spend.

HARBOR action: Bundle existing DLA cyber task orders into a single "Enterprise Cyber Hygiene" task order proposal. Use the EO as justification: "FFP managed service reduces procurement friction and demonstrates efficiency."

3 Growth Pathways

Path	Timeframe	Investment	Revenue Potential	Key Action
A. Deepen DLA (Defend & Expand)	0-12 months	Low	$10M-$20M	Bundle 7 cyber task orders into 1 enterprise managed service. Propose to DLA JETS contracting officer as "EO-compliant FFP consolidation."
B. PAE AS&A (The Greenfield)	6-18 months	Medium	$5M-$15M	Leverage existing PAE C2 relationship + Forrest's ASB access to build PAE AS&A (logistics portfolio) as a new client. Position NGT-II + cyber + SETA as a "logistics IT platform."
C. Navy/USMC (The Unlock)	12-36 months	High	$15M-$40M	Acquire SeaPort-NxG (or partner as exclusive sub with a holder). Chris Choby has the relationships; the vehicle is the blocker. If SeaPort-NxG on-ramp opens, bid aggressively. Alternative: build NAVSUP LRAE relationships via OASIS+ Unrestricted as interim path.

Three Framings to Test Internally

These are how the data lands when you read it cold. If they don't match what you see from the inside, that's the conversation.

What the data suggests	The question that follows
The vehicle portfolio is the rarest part of the business. All 3 OASIS+ pools, ITES-3S prime, DLA JETS 2.0, GSA Schedule since 2011, CMMC L2 (110/110 per company). Few small businesses hold this stack.	If the vehicles are the moat, which one is most under-utilized today, and what would full utilization require?
The transponder business is already structured like a product. NGT-II hardware + cellular/satellite airtime + 24/7 Service Desk. The shape of recurring revenue exists. The pricing model doesn't.	What would it take to publish a per-asset-per-month price for NGT-II as a managed service, not just a contract line-item?
DLA concentration is power and risk. 45% of lifetime awards. The April 2026 fixed-price EO is a tailwind for the FFP-native JETS portfolio. Margin compression is the real concern.	If DLA proposed consolidating 7 cyber task orders into one enterprise managed service to demonstrate EO compliance, could you price it FFP and protect margin?
Forrest's Army Science Board role is upstream influence, not a procurement lever. It signals senior Army trust. It does not move PAE contracting officers directly.	How does the team translate ASB-level visibility into PAE AS&A penetration without leaning on it as a sales asset?

What the Data Suggests Is On the Table

Not a roadmap. Just the leverage points the public record points to.

The recurring-revenue question is the single biggest leverage point. At ~15-20% recurring, the gap to a healthy federal product company (40-60%) is the productization arc.
The Navy access gap (no SeaPort-NxG) sits between Chris Choby's relationships and task orders. Vehicle, not relationship, is the blocker.
Margin mix across 10 vehicles is opaque from outside. NGT-II and GSA Schedule are likely the margin engines. ITES-3S "Team LOGC2" is likely volume, not profit.
Brand positioning currently reads as generic federal IT. The data tells a more specific story (hardware + CMMC L2 + TS clearance + all 3 OASIS+ pools).
The product-vs-services tension shows up in the 28 task orders. The deliveries say IT and cyber. The branding says logistics. One of them is wrong.

This analysis is HARBOR's outside-in view. What we'd do next depends on what you confirm or correct.