Section 5

The Mirror: What Federal Buyers See

What does the market see when it looks at Connected Logistics? Not our opinion. What the data actually says. Below are observations from multiple personas, followed by real research on the key questions.

This is unsolicited HARBOR research prepared from public sources for discussion with Chris Choby. It is not a deliverable under any executed engagement, contains analytical estimates, and should not be relied upon for investment, pricing, or business-development decisions. Statements attributed to Connected Logistics are drawn from public materials and have not been independently confirmed by the company.

6 Observations: What the Data Says

#ObservationEvidenceWhat Buyers See
1A "services company" with a product side-hustle~85-90% of active task orders are service delivery ($55.3M awards vs ~$16.5M revenue). GSA Schedule since 2011. Hardware (NGT-II transponders) is real and growing but still small vs. Services.Another IT services vendor. But with a logistics angle
2DLA is their lifeblood45% of lifetime federal awards are from DLA ($131.5M of $288.5M). 7 active JETS task orders. DLA concentration is their greatest strength and greatest risk.Reliable DLA partner with cyber/IT capability
3Founder-driven institutional knowledgeForrest Burke is on the Army Science Board (2023-2024 biographies). Former Army G-4 CTO. Personally developed 11 Army systems. But the company website barely references the Army Science Board. A credential most competitors would put on the homepage."Who's Forrest?". Unless they already know, they don't find out
4Certifications ahead of the curveCMMC L2 certified Oct 2025 (110/110 NIST controls MET per company release). ISO/IEC 20000-1:2018 recertified Mar 2026. DCAA approved Dec 2020. Most competitors are still scrambling for CMMC.This vendor takes compliance seriously. They can handle CUI
5Vehicle-rich but Navy-poor10 vehicles + GSA Schedule. All 3 OASIS+ pools. But NO SeaPort-NxG. The Navy's dominant IT vehicle. Chris Choby has Navy/USMC relationships but can't access task orders on the primary Navy vehicle.Strong Army/DLA player; limited Navy prime capability
6"The Say vs. The Deliver"Website says: "Logistics is more than just moving boxes and tracking assets." The deliveries (28 active task orders): 7 cybersecurity/network ops, 2 transponder hardware, 1 SETA, 1 Salesforce DevSecOps, and the rest IT-services-coded. The branding emphasizes logistics. The work-mix points more squarely at IT and cyber with a logistics specialty."Logistics" branding reads narrower than the actual deliverables

The Mirror, in One Sentence

"GSA Schedule since 2011. CMMC L2 at 110/110 per company release. TS facility clearance. Manufactured hardware shipping to NATO. Few SDVOSBs hold any one of these. You hold all four."

The current website doesn't lead with the stack. It buries the hardware story. It doesn't mention the Army Science Board. It doesn't surface the GSA Schedule. The result reads as generic federal IT services positioning, indistinguishable from a long tail of other SDVOSBs.

🔍 Real Answers to the 7 Critical Questions

These are not questions to ask Chris at a cocktail party. These are research questions that HARBOR answered using public data. So you can have an informed conversation, not an interrogation.

Q1: What percentage of revenue is recurring vs: One-time task orders?

Answer: We estimate ~15-20% recurring, ~50-60% FFP task-order dependent, ~15-25% pass-through.

How we calculated it (all public data):
  • Recurring/Stable (~15-20%): NGT-II transponder airtime (cellular/satellite) is billed monthly. Hardware is one-time but airtime is ongoing. GSA Schedule GS-35F-0204X (active since 2011) generates steady small-dollar orders and renewals. ITES-3S guaranteed minimum (W52P1J18F0262) is a contractual revenue floor. RF-ITV IV Service Desk is 24/7 support. Recurring labor.
  • FFP Task-Order Dependent (~50-60%): All 7 DLA JETS task orders are FFP with 2-5 year periods. Must recompete when expired. ITES-3S task orders (AIE Break-Fix, MEDCHART, AESMP SETA) are base+option periods. Each requires recompetition on expiration. This is the core revenue model.
  • Pass-Through/Thin Margin (~15-25%): ITES-3S "Team LOGC2" bids include subcontractors (Leidos, Array, Onyx, MetroStar). On large task orders, Connected Logistics primes but teammates execute significant scope. Revenue flows through with thin margins. The $16.5M estimated revenue vs. $55.3M award volume gap supports this model.
The Strategic Implication: At ~15-20% recurring, Connected Logistics is not a "product company." It's a services company with a product side-hustle. A healthy federal contractor product business would target 40-60% recurring. The HARBOR argument: transponder subscriptions + GSA Schedule services + productized IT offerings can grow the recurring slice.

Q2: How many of your transponder customers are on multi-year contracts vs: Spot buys?

Answer: NGT-II is awarded as multi-year FFP delivery orders with option periods. Not spot buys.

Evidence:
  • NGT-II is awarded under ITES-3S (W519TC25FA253 / W519TC25FA219). ITES-3S task orders typically have a base period of 2-3 years with up to three 1-year options.
  • The contract is described as a "commercial requirement". ACC-RI solicitation. Meaning it's structured as a recurring supply contract, not ad-hoc spot purchases.
  • Customer list includes "DoD, USCG, other Federal Agencies, NATO". These are institutional customers, not individual unit spot-buys.
  • militaryitv.com promotes "24/7 service desk". A recurring service model, not one-time hardware.
What We Don't Know (Data Gaps): We cannot see individual customer contract terms. Some agencies may buy via blanket ordering agreements under the NGT-II contract (making each call a "spot buy" but within a multi-year BPA). The transponder hardware itself is a one-time purchase per unit, but the airtime/service is ongoing.

Implication: The model is already trending toward recurring (hardware + subscription). The opportunity is to make the "subscription" portion explicit and grow it. Moving from "we sell transponders" to "we sell in-transit visibility as a service."

Q3: What would it take to put the RF-ITV Service Desk on a GSA Schedule as a standalone product?

Answer: The first step is already done. They HAVE a GSA Schedule (GS-35F-0204X). The question is whether RF-ITV Service Desk capabilities are already listed as deliverable SINs/CLINs under that Schedule.

What We Found:
  • GSA eLibrary confirms LOGC2 INC (dba Connected Logistics) holds Contract #GS-35F-0204X under the Multiple Award Schedule (MAS IT Schedule 70), awarded February 3, 2011. Still active.
  • The current GSA Schedule catalog (available as a PDF on GSA Advantage) would list Special Item Numbers (SINs). If RF-ITV Service Desk is not already captured under an existing SIN (e.g., SIN 518210C for cloud services, SIN 54151S for IT professional services), an "Modification to Add SIN" is required.
  • Typical timeline: 60-90 days for a GSA Schedule modification. Cost: minimal (mostly internal labor + GSA review fee).
  • Alternatively, if RF-ITV is classified as a "cloud SaaS" offering, SIN 519120 (Cloud and Cloud-Related IT Professional Services) is the correct vehicle. If it's help desk/support, SIN 54151S works.
The Bigger Opportunity: Putting RF-ITV Service Desk on the GSA Schedule is not just about RF-ITV. It's about making all their managed IT services available to small agencies, state/local via cooperative purchasing, and the VA (which buys heavily through GSA). With DOJ forecasting 76 IT services requirements ($1.62B) and 14% going through GSA/GWACs, having the right SINs is prerequisite to even being discovered.

Q4: Which of your 10 vehicles actually generates the most margin: Not just the most revenue?

Answer: We cannot know exact margins from public data. But we can infer with high confidence that NGT-II (transponders) and GSA Schedule direct orders have the highest margins, while ITES-3S "Team LOGC2" task orders have the lowest.

Margin Inference Framework (Public Evidence):
VehicleRevenue VolumeEstimated MarginReasoning
NGT-II TranspondersModest (growing)HighestProduct business: hardware margin + recurring airtime/service margin. No subcontractor pass-through. FFP pricing means margin is baked in. Militaryitv.com is a direct-to-customer channel.
GSA Schedule (GS-35F-0204X)Low volumeHighDirect sales at negotiated rates. No BD cost to win each order. No subcontractor share. Small but pure-margin.
DLA JETS 2.0 Task OrdersHigh (~45% of awards)MediumFFP competitive task orders. Must price aggressively to win. But no teammate pass-through on most JETS awards. Connected Logistics appears to deliver directly (NETOPS, CERT CSSP, micro-segmentation).
ITES-3S Task OrdersHighMedium-Low"Team LOGC2" structure means subcontractors (Leidos, Array, Onyx, MetroStar) take significant scope. Prime retains G&A + fee margin but labor margin flows to teammates. AIE Break-Fix with MetroStar is explicitly a teammate arrangement.
Canopy Health JV (T4NG2)Unknown (JV revenue share)JV-dependentJoint venture structure. Revenue and margin depend on JV agreement terms. $60.7B vehicle ceiling is irrelevant; what matters is task order win rate and profit split.
OASIS+Early (2024+)UnknownPool rates are standardized. Margin depends on delivery efficiency and teammate structure. Too new to assess from public data.
The Strategic Insight: If ~50-60% of revenue is from ITES-3S (medium-low margin) and only ~10-15% is from NGT-II (high margin), Connected Logistics is optimized for volume, not profitability. The HARBOR argument: grow NGT-II recurring airtime, expand GSA Schedule utilization, and productize RF-ITV as a SaaS offering to shift the margin mix without growing headcount proportionally.

Q5: If the fixed-price EO forces DLA to restructure JETS task orders, are you ready?

Answer: Yes. They are already ahead of the curve.

Evidence:
  • The April 30, 2026 EO makes FFP the default. All 7 of Connected Logistics's active DLA JETS task orders are already Firm Fixed Price (SP470923F0075, SP470924F0059, SP470925F0015, SP470924F0005, SP470925F0007, SP470924F0064, SP470922F0054. All FFP per USAspending data).
  • DLA JETS 2.0 was designed as an FFP vehicle from inception (replacing JETS 1.0's more mixed structure). DLA is the agency least likely to be disrupted by the EO. They're already there.
  • The EO's real impact is on consulting and SETA work. Cost-reimbursement contracts above $10M-$100M. Connected Logistics's SETA work (W519TC24F0115 AESMP, $5.3M) is below the threshold and already transitioning.
  • Connected Logistics's CMMC L2 (110/110 per company) and ISO 20000/27001 certifications demonstrate process maturity. Exactly what buyers need to justify FFP awards under the EO (agencies need confidence in vendor capability to fix price).
The Risk: The EO may compress margins industry-wide. FFP means the contractor absorbs all cost risk. If DLA restructures existing task orders to be more aggressively priced (to demonstrate EO compliance), Connected Logistics's margins on JETS work could shrink. Their readiness is structural. They already bid FFP. But margin pressure is the real concern, not contract type disruption.

Q6: Forrest is on the Army Science Board: Does that relationship open doors to the new PAE construct?

Answer: Indirectly, yes. But it's not a direct reporting-line door-opener.

What We Found:
  • Forrest Burke is confirmed on the Army Science Board (ASB) in the 2023 and 2024 biography books (PDFs available via Army Science Board public documents). The ASB is a senior advisory body to the Army on science and technology matters. Not an operational acquisition chain-of-command body.
  • The ASB does NOT have procurement authority. It makes recommendations to the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff on S&T priorities. Membership signals senior Army trust and access but does not guarantee contract awards.
  • The PAE construct (Portfolio Acquisition Executives) is an acquisition reform. Operational, not S&T. The six PAEs have embedded Senior Contracting Officials with direct award authority. Forrest's ASB membership connects him to the Secretary/Chief of Staff level, not directly to PAE procurement officers.
  • However: the ASB discusses future Army capabilities. If Forrest is advocating for logistics C2 and in-transit visibility as critical S&T needs (which his career suggests he would), those recommendations flow into PAE portfolio requirements. It's upstream influence, not downstream access.
  • Connected Logistics already lists "PAE Command and Control" as a client. This is the real door. That means they are already working with one of the six PAEs. The ASB membership is credibility reinforcement, not the primary access mechanism.
The Tactical Takeaway: Don't lead with "Forrest is on the Army Science Board" as a sales pitch. It's a credibility validator, not a procurement lever. Lead with the existing PAE C2 relationship and the 19-year logistics IT track record. Reference the ASB in capability briefings as why they understand future Army needs, not as how they get contracts.

Q7: Chris. Your Navy/USMC Rolodex: What's the ONE contract vehicle you'd need to unlock that market?

Answer: SeaPort-NxG. Full stop.

Why:
  • SeaPort-NxG is the Navy's premier multiple-award IDIQ for engineering, program management, and professional support services. It generated 2,965 delivery orders in the Navy Combined LRAE alone. More than any other vehicle category.
  • The Navy Combined LRAE ($351B pipeline) includes 211 records matching NAICS 541519 (IT Services). Connected Logistics's core competency. But SDVOSB set-asides in the Navy LRAE are only 38 records. Most Navy work flows through unrestricted or SB set-aside vehicles. Not SDVOSB-specific channels.
  • Chris Choby managed $225M/year and 500+ staff for Navy/USMC at IBM GBS. He knows the buyers, the requirements, the contracting officers. But without SeaPort-NxG, he cannot bid the task orders those buyers release.
  • OASIS+ Unrestricted (which Connected Logistics HAS) allows bidding on Navy work, but SeaPort-NxG is the Navy's preferred vehicle. Buyers default to what they know. OASIS+ is a backup, not a primary, for Navy contracting officers.
  • SeaPort-NxG has no on-ramp scheduled. The next opportunity may be years away. Missing the current Navy pipeline means Chris's relationships will atrophy or be captured by SeaPort-NxG holders.
  • Alternative vehicles (CIO-SP4, VETS 2) are useful but secondary. SeaPort-NxG is the dominant Navy IT/professional services vehicle. The one that unlocks the relationship pipeline Chris already has.
The Sobering Reality: If Connected Logistics doesn't acquire SeaPort-NxG (or partner as a subcontractor with a SeaPort-NxG holder), Chris's Navy/USMC relationships become a "nice to have" that can't convert to revenue. The $351B Navy LRAE is irrelevant if you can't access the dominant vehicle. This is the #1 BD investment priority for Navy expansion.

Data Sources for This Mirror